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Peter Schuck's Diversity in America makes the most important contribution
in recent years to the clarification of a mostly muddled topic. Whether you
agree or disagree with his conclusions (I do some of both), it is impossible to
come away without a more sophisticated intellectual framework and a far richer
understanding of the stakes.
The book's subtitle, Keeping Government at a Safe Distance, points to one
of Schuck's central themes: Even when we believe that more diversity would
be a good thing, public instrumentalities are often ill-suited to promote it.
"Although law has many strengths," Schuck declares, "the ability to create the
values and experiences we associate with genuine diversity is not one of
them."' Indeed, he continues, "government and law are natural enemies of
diversity, especially when they are most eager to create it."2 The reason, he
argues, has nothing to do with the motives of lawmakers and everything to do
with the nature of law, which acts through categories that inevitably
oversimplify reality. When law tries to acknowledge the true contours of
diversity by establishing ever more nuanced categories or by making broad
grants of discretionary authority, it increases the burdens of enforcement and
creates loci of arbitrary power. Genuine diversity, in Schuck's view, is a
product of "civil society" and "culture," not law, and no amount of legal
engineering, however thoughtful, can obviate this fact.
3
This does not mean that law has no legitimate and beneficial relation to
diversity. Schuck distinguishes between "protecting" and "promoting" diversity
through public policy.4 The latter, he argues, is usually a practical mistake and
often a moral mistake as well. The former, on the other hand, is essential:
While law can be used to repress and homogenize difference, human history
shows that public institutions are needed to safeguard the social diversity that
individuals and groups create for themselves. Consequently, Schuck supports
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robust First Amendment protections as well as the antidiscrimination thrust of
1960s-era civil rights laws, 5 even as he criticizes several efforts (most notably
in Yonkers, New York) to mandate housing integration. 6 Protecting excluded
minorities' right to live where they choose and giving them the resources they
need to do so is one thing; a "take-it-or-leave-it, top-down, court-designed,
court-managed" remedy is something else entirely.
7
To assess these claims, we should begin where Schuck does, with a
taxonomy of diversity. As a freestanding, unqualified term, "diversity" is
virtually (but as we shall see, not entirely) without meaning. The initial
questions are, or ought to be: Diversity of what? Diverse in which respects?
Schuck defines diversity as "those differences in values, attributes, or activities
among individuals or groups that a particular society deems salient to the social
status or behavior of those individuals or groups." 8 This definition has the merit
of emphasizing the relativity of diversity-that is, its rootedness in particular
times, places, and conceptual schemes. For Greek thinkers, differences of birth,
occupation, economic status, and conceptions of justice were fundamental. 9 In
Federalist 10, James Madison stresses differences of interests, talents, and
opinions.1l Orthodox Marxists focused on differences of class to the near-
exclusion of all else, I' which led to the fateful misjudgment in 1914 that
international working-class solidarity would trump nationalist passions. In the
contemporary United States, the class differences that configured the politics of
the New Deal era have largely given way to differences in race, ethnicity,
gender, and religion.
It is fair to say, I think, that the long struggle with the legacy of slavery and
discrimination against African Americans is at the heart of the dominant
understanding of diversity in America today, so much so that many other
aggrieved groups have modeled their struggles for inclusion and equal
treatment on the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. However, this
template for diversity-the assertion (or assumption) that the situation of other
groups is comparable to that of African Americans-has generated some
difficulties. For example, advocates for gay marriage often offer an analogy
between their situation and that of African Americans when interracial
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marriage was prohibited almost everywhere 2-a comparison that many
African-American leaders reject. 13 Be that as it may, we would not be
discussing diversity in the terms we use today (and Schuck probably would not
have written his book) had it not been for the conflicts over race that have
transformed our society and reconfigured our politics over the past half-
century.
In addition to "diversity of what?" we must ask, "diversity where?," and "at
what level of social organization?" It is possible for a political community's
population to be heterogeneous, considered in the aggregate, while being
divided into geographical areas, each of which is ethnically homogeneous. Or
consider education: Increasing diversity within schools can often be achieved
only by reducing diversity among schools. For example, if a government
requires boys and girls to be educated together, every school is diverse with
respect to gender, but all schools are the same with respect to the gender
distribution of their student bodies.
Here, as elsewhere, social understandings prove decisive. From the bare
facts in the education example, it is impossible to conclude that one state of
affairs is more diverse, taken as a whole, than the other. Each community must
decide for itself which unit of analysis is most important-a judgment that is
sure to reflect its understanding of desirable public means as well as some
specification of collective purposes.
This brings us to a third set of defining questions: Diversity for what?
Guided by what principles? A society's sense of its most important problems
will shape the answers. Perhaps some Americans see diversity as what Schuck
calls an "independent social value,"' 4 that is, as a good in itself. For most
Americans, however, the principal value of diversity is as a means for
rectifying wrongs. If certain groups have been excluded from key institutions
and sectors of society, and if society comes to believe that this exclusion is
wrongful, then the principle of diversity can be used to promote inclusion. If
the exclusion of some groups from institutions, such as police departments and
retail sales, impedes the functioning of those institutions, then fostering
diversity enhances their effectiveness. If some groups are held in lower esteem
than others, then diversity functions as an anti-hierarchical principle:
Regardless of religious, racial, and ethnic divisions (to name only a few social
fault-lines), all groups should enjoy equal public standing and regard. John
Stuart Mill favored diversity in part because he believed that exposure to a
wide range of opinions and ways of life would foster greater awareness of
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oneself and others and facilitate social learning. 15 One may also favor diversity
of opinions and ways of life on the grounds that such diversity both expresses
and serves liberty or even because of the stimulation and joy to be found in the
experience of variety.
What is the antonym of diversity? Schuck's answer is homogeneity, which
he regards as problematic if it is a product of coercion.' 6 But there is another,
more traditional answer, namely, unity, understood as an agreement on core
principles accompanied by some degree of sympathetic fellow-feeling among
citizens. Since antiquity, theorists and statesmen have argued that no stable or
decent society can be sustained without civic unity; absent unity, the only
possibilities are anarchy, tyranny, or civil war.17 But opinions have changed
concerning the kinds and degrees of unity that social order requires. For
example, it was long thought that civic unity rested on religious homogeneity.
It took an intellectual revolution in the seventeenth century to propose, and then
test, the proposition that civic tranquility and unity can be secured in
circumstances of religious diversity. It took another intellectual revolution in
the eighteenth century to suggest that multiple diversities--of interests and
secular opinions as well as religious faith-can support (and perhaps even be a
necessary condition for) stable constitutional self-government.
The underlying issue is the extent to which the state (the largest unit of
political authority) should use its coercive power to create homogeneity
throughout the society it governs. One part of the answer is empirical: the
extent to which the state's capacity to carry out its core functions depends on a
higher degree of uniformity than the uncoordinated decisions of individuals,
groups, and political subunits within society would produce. The experience of
modernity demonstrates that governments can accept more social diversity
without loss of political capacity than pre-modern theorists and statesmen
believed possible. Nevertheless, as Schuck rightly observes, there are limits.
Because political communities are held together by bonds of mutual regard and
trust, a diversity that is "too widespread, too divisive, too inward-looking, and
runs too deeply can narrow or dissolve these bonds--or even prevent them
from forming in the first place."''
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Many current debates between "civic liberals" and "diversity liberals" rest
on contestable empirical judgments concerning the threat to civic unity posed
by specific kinds of diversity. Scholars such as James Davison Hunter argue
that contemporary differences of cultural outlook go so deep as to amount to a
culture war that threatens national unity.' 9 Others such as Alan Wolfe reply that
a surprisingly wide range of cultural consensus exists among the general public,
although it is often obscured by contestation among mobilized elites.20 For the
most part, Schuck presents himself as a defender of diversity, which makes his
contention that "the challenges to national unity are probably greater than at
any time since the Civil War"21 all the more surprising. In any event, I do not
believe a fair reading of the evidence sustains his uncharacteristically alarmist
view.
I have focused on ways in which empirical features of social life can shape
judgments about the range of permissible diversity. Another part of the answer
is normative: the respects in which the decisions of individuals, groups, and
political subunits produce outcomes inconsistent with core principles that the
state has decided it must enforce uniformly throughout the territory it governs.
Until the momentous decisions the United States began to make fifty years ago,
claims based on "states' rights" were used successfully not only to defend the
legal separation of the races, but also to deny central attributes of citizenship,
such as the right to vote.
Today, the debate over the right of the national government to enforce
uniformity of citizenship rights throughout subordinate political units is mostly
over. While the states continue to regulate the time, place, and manner of
voting, for example, they can no longer deny or dilute the votes of discrete
minorities within their jurisdictions.22 Some residual disputes remain, of course.
While the laws of marriage and divorce have long been a state rather than a
federal matter, yielding a considerable diversity of eligibility requirements, the
Supreme Court has decided that the underlying right to marry has constitutional
roots and that certain regulations (such as the prohibition on interracial
marriages) violate core constitutional principles. 23 It remains to be seen
whether the evolving constitutional jurisprudence will ultimately strike down
prohibitions on same-sex marriage. The push for a federal constitutional
amendment defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman reflects
social conservatives' fears about just such an outcome. By contrast, many
advocates of gay marriage would be satisfied with a state-by-state approach,
which would inevitably yield long-term differences among the states on this
19. JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991).
20. ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION, AFTER ALL (1998).
21. SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 99.
22. See Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2000).
23. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
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matter.
The debate over the right of public authorities to enforce uniformity on the
institutions of civil society is far less settled. I agree with Schuck when he
insists that "the distinction between public and private morality, between the
values laws should mandate and those it should leave to the disparate choices
of a diverse civil society, lies at the core of a liberal society," 24 and that "the
diversity that flows from the[] exercise of individual freedom is presumptively
valid., 25 I also agree with Schuck's application of this principle to the freedom
of association: "[I]f valuing diversity in a liberal society means anything, it
means assuring people's freedom to form exclusive groups that embrace
unpopular beliefs in ways permitted by the Constitution and without undue
interference by the law." 26 Consistent with this approach, Schuck endorses the
conclusion the Supreme Court reached in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,27
which upheld the right of the Scouts to exclude gays from its leadership
positions.
28
Schuck devotes an impressive chapter to relations between government and
religious associations. His general thesis is that government regulation should
be guided by two principles of neutrality: "among religions, and between the
religious values of a pious people and the secular values of a liberal civic
culture." 29 He acknowledges, however, that there is no non-neutral way of
moving from the abstract concept of neutrality to a specific conception, the
content and application of which are bound to be "highly contestable."3° After
all, Justice Scalia defended his notorious decision in Employment Division,
31Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, which delivered a body
blow to strategies of religious accommodation, as an appropriately neutral
response to demands for free exercise exemptions from generally valid state
laws.
For this reason, among others, the lines between public and private morality
and between appropriate and inappropriate government intervention in faith-
based institutions, are often difficult to draw. For example, the Internal
Revenue Code offers an exemption from federal income taxes to organizations
performing "charitable" activities. 32 Bob Jones University, an educational
institution with a fundamentalist Christian orientation, banned interracial dating
on the grounds that the Bible prohibits mixing of the races. When the grant of a
24. SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 195.
25. Id. at 57.
26. Id. at 326.
27. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
28. Id. at 38.
29. Id. at 263.
30. Id.
31. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
32. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
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tax exemption to the University was challenged, the Supreme Court ultimately
ruled that it should be withdrawn because the practices of the university were
"contrary to public policy. '33 The Court seemed to have in mind public values
of a high order, those that are basic to our constitutional structure and
traditions. The Bob Jones case stands for the proposition that while the
government must be neutral among religions, and between faith-based and
secular institutions, in granting tax exemptions, it may nonetheless use non-
neutral criteria to screen out some otherwise eligible applicants. Schuck never
discusses this case, and it is not clear whether he regards it as consistent with
his neutrality-based approach.
There is a deeper reason why the line between permissible and
impermissible public action is often difficult to draw. Schuck distinguishes four
different stances government may adopt toward diversity-"protecting,
promoting, exploiting, and empowering." 34 I will not tarry on the latter two.
Suffice it to say that empowering diversity involves providing the resources
and other conditions needed for individuals to choose freely (school vouchers,
for example), while exploiting diversity means using various kinds of civil
associations in pursuit of public purposes (President Bush's faith-based
initiative for the delivery of social services is an example). Within broad limits,
Schuck supports both of these strategies.
The real action lies elsewhere, in the distinction between protecting
diversity, which Schuck strongly supports, and promoting it, which he
generally opposes. In protecting minorities against discrimination, he declares
that the liberal State "need not, indeed should not, advance any particular
conception of how much and what kinds of diversity are socially optimal. 35 In
practice, of course, the line between protection and promotion is not so bright,
and Schuck knows this. For example, he notes that the Bill of Rights "promotes
diversity by protecting freedom of religion, thought, speech, privacy, and many
other conditions that nourish a diversity of beliefs, ideas, associations, and
practices." 36 In fact, James Madison explicitly promoted diversity. Not only did
he argue, on theoretical grounds, that increased diversity was the inevitable
consequence of increased liberty; 37 he favored more diversity in the belief that
it would help ward off the popular tyranny into which (in his view) the
democratic majorities of Greek antiquity had typically degenerated. His
advocacy of the "extended republic" in opposition to those arguing the
traditional case for small republics pivoted on the proposition that a larger
33. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 582 (1983).
34. SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 27-28.
35. Id. at 27.
36. Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
37. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (James Madison).
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political community would surely be a more diverse community. 38
Schuck's aversion to diversity-promoting policies raises crucial questions
for the conduct of public education. While he supports, for example,
experimentation with same-sex schools, he argues that government's role is
"not to promote such schools but only to eliminate discriminatory rules that
unfairly inhibit them." 39 This is perplexing on its face: Surely the efforts of
local governments, such as the city of Detroit, to foster important educational
and safety objectives through same-sex public schools amount to promotion.
Does Schuck oppose this?
Or consider the history of American public education in the half century
since Brown v. Board of Education. Nearly everyone can agree on the
necessity of using law to sweep away de jure discrimination and segregation.
But what about integration, brought about by law rather than the decisions of
families? In discussing the efforts of a federal judge to integrate housing in
Yonkers, Schuck notes what he regards as a paradoxical relation between
diversity and law: "The harder the law tries to create or promote diversity, the
more law magnifies and highlights its own weaknesses, and the more law
reveals as inauthentic, illegitimate, and disvalued the diversity that it
fashions. '41 This general view of law could lead us to conclude that using law
to enforce school integration leads at best to outcomes (namely, diverse student
bodies) that are inauthentic and illegitimate. Is that Schuck's view? If not, if on
his view legally enforced school integration may be acceptable, on what basis
can we distinguish between proper and improper uses of law to promote
diversity?
The root of the difficulty is this: Schuck's distinction between coercive
government and free civil society is too sharp to sustain. As Schuck knows very
well, law is more than a neutral framework within which individuals make
choices. Citizens express what they value through collective as well as
individual decisions. In every society, law promotes an ensemble of preferred
public purposes. In so doing, law imparts a characteristic tendency to the civil
society it frames. While liberal societies are distinctive in the scope they afford
for civil society, their legal systems are no more devoid of purpose than are
others. I agree with Schuck that liberal societies ought not regard fostering
diversity as an end in itself. However, to the extent that promoting diversity
serves as a means for the attainment of legitimate liberal purposes, there is in
principle no reason why the law cannot do so. If it is true that integration, not
merely non-discrimination, in public education is needed to achieve the
promise of equal citizenship and civic unity, then the public effort to create
38. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
39. SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 326.
40. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
41. SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 322.
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schools in which races and ethnic groups learn and play together cannot be
dismissed as a misunderstanding of the rule of law.
As a practical matter, the use of law to promote diversity may fail, either
because the effort creates too much collateral damage or because popular
objections thwart its implementation. Schuck is right to suggest that judges and
legislatures have not always weighed these considerations wisely and that the
consequences have often been social conflict rather than social progress. But it
is important not to turn these prudential difficulties into matters of general
principle.
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